Beyond the State of Alarm: COVID-19 in Spain by Presno Linera, Miguel Ángel
Beyond the State of Alarm: COVID-19
in Spain
Miguel Ángel Presno Linera 2020-05-13T09:42:49
Three states of emergency
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 (SC) includes a specific provision (Article 116) for
the three so-called states of emergency – the state of alarm, state of exception, and
state of siege – which shall be regulated by an Organic Law. The Government shall
declare the state of alarm by decree, decided upon by the Council of Ministers, and
shall specify the territorial area to which the effects of the proclamation shall apply.
It can last up to 15 days at maximum and only be extended, with no limit, by the
authorization of the Congress. The state of exception should be authorized by the
Congress and then declared by the Government by decree decided upon the Council
of Ministers. It must specifically indicate its effects, the territorial area to which it
is to apply and its duration which may not exceed 30 days, subject to extension
for a further 30 days period with the same requirements. In addition, Art. 55.1 SC
establishes that only in the states of exception and siege can some fundamental
rights be suspended, but not in the ‘state of alarm’, where they can only be limited.
The Organic Law referred to in Art. 116.1 SC is Organic Law 4/1981 of 1st June 1981
on the alarm, exception and siege states. It was applied for only the second time in
the recent Spanish constitutional history on the 14th March 2020. On that day the
Government’s decree 463/2020 ‘declaring the state of alarm for the management
of the health crisis caused by COVID-19’ was passed. The only precedent for a
state of alarm is almost ten years old (see here) and is completely unrelated to the
current situation as it did not have to do with a viral pandemic but with an air traffic
controller’s strike. Since 15th March, several House of Deputies’ sessions have
been held to discuss the declaration of the state of alarm and to authorize, so far,
four extensions of fifteen days each, with the fourth lasting up until 24th May 2020
(Decree 476/2020 of 27th March, Decree 487/2020 of 10th April, Decree 492/2020 of
24th April, Decree 514/2020 of 8th May).
The Organic Law 4/1981 specifies some aspects that the Spanish Constitution
does not expressly regulate, among them, the circumstances in which each of the
states of emergency can be declared. While the state of alarm can be declared,
among other situations, in ‘health crises, such as epidemics and severe pollution
situations’ (Art.4(b)), the state of exception can only be activated when there is a
severe threat to the public order (Art.13.1). This being so, the declaration of the
former during the COVID-19 pandemic is justified. However, those who believe that
the government should have declared the state of emergency argue that there has
been a breakdown of the public order and that the measures adopted fit better in
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the state of exception. Given their intensity, especially the strong limits imposed on
the freedom of movement, they are rather suspensions than mere restrictions of
fundamental rights.
The confinements imposed by the Spanish Government in response to the pandemic
are among the most intense in comparative terms since they contain a prohibition
of going out into the street with the only exceptions set out in Article 7 of Decree
463/2020: acquisition of food, pharmaceutical products and staples; providing
assistance to health centres, services and facilities; commute; return to the habitual
residence; assistance and care of children, minors, disabled or especially vulnerable
persons; go to financial and insurance institutions; or due to force majeure or
situation of need, or any other activity of similar nature.
Of legal bases, competences and parliamentary
control
Considering first the extensive scope of the lockdown (or rather ‘Lock-In’), the
first issue that needs to be discussed is whether the restrictions imposed by the
Decree comply with the provisions of the Organic Law 4/1981 for the state of alarm.
Art. 11(a) enables the Government to ‘limit the movement and stay of the people
and vehicles during specific hours and places, or place conditions on them to the
fulfilment of certain requirements’. From my point of view, the prohibition of going
out into the street except in very concrete situations is more than a simple limitation
of the freedom of movement. In fact, for the state of exception, Art. 20.1 allows the
Government to ‘ban the movement of people and vehicles in specific hours and
places’. The confinements imposed are closer to this latter ban than to the former
limitation on movement. However, this does not mean it is the state of exception
that should have been declared since the current situation is entirely in line with the
enabling clause of the state of alarm (i.e. a health crisis such as an epidemic). It
simply means that some of the measures adopted have gone too far beyond what is
permitted when taking into account what can be done under the legal framework of
the state of alarm. It would be advisable, therefore, to revise the states of emergency
when the pandemic is over in order to improve the legal basis to face up future
extraordinary situations.
The second issue raised is Spain’s decentralized structure. The concerns largely
relate to the wide competences attributed to the Health Minister during the
coronavirus crisis, since it is the autonomous regions of the country that decide upon
healthcare, and not the central government. The measures adopted have arguably
not been previously negotiated with the autonomous regions, but instead unilaterally
imposed, and thus undermine the regional competence on health matters. However,
the autonomous regions have held some scope for action in regard to the crisis in
managing, for example, areas such as health supplies.
The third issue relates to the role of parliament during the pandemic. Art. 116.5 SC
establishes that:
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Congress may not be dissolved while any of the states of emergency and
if the Houses are not in session, they must automatically be convened.
Their functioning (…) may not be interrupted while any of these states are
in operation.
Parliaments – the national and the regional ones – are still in session but they have
reduced their activity. In Congress it has been limited to voting for the validation of
several Decree-Laws passed by the Government which include labour, social and
economic measures, and also to authorizing the extensions of the state of the alarm,
as well as to the celebration of some of the control sessions of the Health Minister.
In this sense, some political parties of the opposition consider that the parliamentary
control of the Government should be intensified in relation to the coronavirus crisis
demanding, for instance, more discussion in the Houses of Parliament. Apart
from that, some regional elections (Galicia and the Basque Country) have been
postponed by the decision of the regional Governments involved.
Jurisdiction and legal standing
The final issue raised is that it is important to know which Tribunal is in charge of the
judicial review of the decree of state of alarm and its extensions, and whether it is the
Constitutional Court (which has the monopoly over all judicial review of laws) or the
Supreme Court (which holds ordinary jurisdiction). On this point, useful direction can
be taken from what happened when the previous state of alarm was declared. On
that occasion, the Spanish Supreme Court approved seven decisions between 2011
and 2012 which all rejected jurisdiction to review the legality of the Government’s
decrees. According to the Court, the Government had acted as a constitutional
body since it had exercised powers directly regulated by the Constitution, not by
administrative law, highlighting also that the decree was accepted by the Congress,
which had authorized its extension. The Court considered that, since it was a
resolution of the Congress, it should be judicially reviewed by the Constitutional
Court because it was not an ‘administrative act’. However, the Supreme Court did
not provide judgment on what would have happened if Congress had not voted
for the extension. Could it have reviewed the initial decree? Would it have been
‘administrative’ in nature? In my view, the authorization of the extension by the
Congress does not change the legal nature of the decree: it is in any case a norm
decided upon the Council of Ministers and, in this sense, its legality should be
judicially reviewed by the Supreme Court.
However, this is not the current opinion of neither the Supreme Court nor of the
Constitutional Court. The latter, by a majority decision first in 2012 (Constitutional
Court Order 7/2012, 13rd January 2012) and then, in 2016, by an unanimous
decision (Constitutional Court 83/2016, 28th April 2016) has ruled that the
Government’s decree declaring the state of alarm is an
act with the force of law, expression of the exercise of a competence
constitutionally attributed to the Lower House ex Art.116 SC in order to
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protect, in the corresponding states of emergency, the rights and freedoms
of citizens.
The Constitutional Court considered that although it was a norm enacted by the
Council of Ministers, the decree had the force of law since it could exception norms
with that same force so, along with the Constitution and the Organic Law 4/1981,
they were all sources of the law of exception.
In short, both the decree declaring the state of alarm and the following agreements
of the Congress authorizing its extension can only be judicially reviewed by the
Constitutional Court. A declaration of unconstitutionality may be issued in response
to: (a) an action of unconstitutionality; or (b) a question of unconstitutionality
raised by judges or law courts. The following have standing to bring an action of
unconstitutionality: the President of the Government; the Ombudsperson; fifty
Deputies; or fifty Senators. The Governments and Parliaments of the Autonomous
regions also have standing to bring an action of unconstitutionality against provisions
or enactments having the force of law that may affect their own area of autonomy.
If a judge or a court, proprio motu or at the request of a party, considers that an
enactment having the force of law which is applicable to a case, and upon which the
validity of the ruling of the ruling of the depends may be contrary to the Constitution,
then the judge or court can raise the question before the Constitutional Court. So far,
the 52 deputies of Vox (right-wing party) have brought an action of unconstitutionality
against the Government’s decrees, which has already been accepted for judicial
review by the Constitutional Court; and a private citizen has also appealed them
before the Supreme Court, an appeal that has been declared inadmissible.
Tackling the secondary effects
The coronavirus pandemic shows with all its harshness not only its devastating
effects on the health and life of thousands of people, but also, as Ulrich Beck
predicted in 1986 (Risikogesellschaft – Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne) the
‘secondary’ effects at a social, economic and political level: more impoverishment
and exclusion of the most vulnerable people, loss of hundreds of thousands of jobs,
the inability of political institutions to foresee and effectively deal with risks difficult to
predict but which they are accountable for.
Therefore, as soon as a certain ‘state of normality’ returns, there must be an
intense political, social and legal reflection on how to effectively respond to the risks
inherent to this ‘society of catastrophe’ that we live in. The Law of exception, broadly
speaking, should not only be part of it, but must be one of the essential points of a
deep discussion that should aim at ‘establishing an advanced democratic society’ as
set out in the preamble of the Spanish Constitution.
Special thanks to Carlos Closa and Patricia García Majado.
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